Introduction
In many situations in which a hierarchical relationship occurs for the achievement of some project it is good practice for the supervisor to define intermediary steps. These intermediary steps provide an opportunity to check that everything goes as expected, cash payments are indeed made, well defined parts of the projects are achieved, and so on.
In some sense one could say that a reference path has been agreed upon. The idea of the paper is that model building should be considered as a joint learning exercice the role of which is to elicit standards of behavior for actual action.
In the context of this paper one will have to discuss why it may be meaningful for the players to decompose a large project into smaller ones, under what conditions is tacit agreement to go on enough to bring up tacit coordination, whether or not the uncertainty on the expertise of the agent can be detrimental to the relationship... In fact, it will be argued that the role of standards is far more robust with respect to these questions than the reputation effect is. The Basic Reference Model.
This game is to be interpreted as follows:
(i) Player 1 and Player 2 may jointly operate an on going project for N stages.
(ii) Player 1 provides the money and Player 2 provides the expertise.
(iii) There is a probability p that Player 2 be the perfect expert for the project in which case he is indeed Player 2 R (R for reference Player), but there is a probability 1 -p that he only be an imperfect expert.
(iv) If he is an imperfect expert, at each stage he may either be lucky (with probability 1/2), in which case everything goes as if he were the perfect expert, or he may be unlucky (with probability 1/2), in which case he may decide to stop the project (s) rather than to continue (c), the selection of s is an opportunistic move but it is revealing whereas the selection of c is costly and not revealing. (vi) Observe that this game involves two types of chance moves. The first chance move on H and L occurs only at the beginning of the game whereas the second one occurs as many times as the number of stages to be played (without loss of generality one could change the probability distribution on the second chance move and adjust the payoffs accordingly).
To get further insight about this game consider the special case p = 0, no repetition and take the expectation over the second chance move (see figure 2).
(1, 1-k/2) (0,0) (1 -K/2, 1)
The Game for p = 0.
It is now apparent that if K>2 and 0< k <2 then the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is (S, s) whereas the payoffs associated with (C, c) strictly dominate (0, 0). If the Players could commit themselves to (C, c) then this would be preferable to a non cooperative play. This is the well known centipede game of Rosenthal.
Let us come back to the original situation.
The fact that they cannot commit themselves may come from the non observability of the move c and from the fact that to write a contingent contract may be too complicated. Then the players are left with the possibility of defining a "proxy" as a standard of behavior.
In this case it may mean to achieve an outcome of 1 for player 1. It is now common knowledge that not to satisfy this standard will interrupt the game because in that case it is also common knowledge that the outcome of 1 will not be achieved in the last period, and in fact in no future periods at all. In a sense, the model of the game is part of the accepted standard. F (K, k, p, N) it is a strictly dominating strategy for Player 2 to always stop (}tl = 0 for all n, 1 A n < N) as long as The Multiplicity of Equilibria in the Normal Form.
This normal form game has another equilibrium namely (0, 0, 1) and (0, 1). The fact that this equilibrium is not sequential can be interpreted as a time inconsistency in Player l's reasoning. Start with statement 1 that Player 1 plays S because he expects Player 2 to play s whatsoever. This implies that had he payed C and observed c he would almost be sure to face a good guy so that he should again play C. This is self contradictory since it leads Player 2 to deviate and play c. In what way the players share any incentive to structure their relationship according to some basic rules embedded in a formal model becomes a major question for the analyst.
In this respect it is interesting to depict the impact of the reference effect through the graphs of Player 1's average expected payoff as a function of p and N (cf. figure 4) The Graphs of Player 1's Average Expected Payoff.
As for the equilibrium path it can be summarized as consisting of three parts: tacit cooperation for sure in the early stages, then tacit cooperation only with some probability (constant for Player 1, decreasing for Player 2), finally defection for sure for Player 2 and continuation as long as possible for Player 1. In the second part of the equilibrium path the net gains for continuing the relationship is clearly zero since the players are randomizing, yet the players exactly manipulate their strategies to generate a positive outcome in the early stages. In a loose way one could say that they agree to correlate their strategies over time and this certainly justifies the idea that the actual path embeds some joint rationality aspects as opposed to a pure individualistic interpretation of Nash solutions.
This feature of the model is particularly convincing in this case since it is in both players' own interest to do so that is, to accept the model as a reference. The corresponding graphs for the Kreps and Wilson's model
